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Mitchell v. Wisconsin: Warrantless Blood Tests on
Unconscious DWI Suspects are “Almost Always”
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment

P INCHAS BALSAM* ©
In Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court addressed whether police can obtain
a warrantless blood sample from an unconscious driving while intoxicated (DWI)
suspect.1 The Court held that when a DWI suspect is unconscious, the police can
“almost always” order a blood test without obtaining a warrant.2 Nevertheless, the
Court remanded the case to give Mitchell an opportunity to show that the police could
have reasonably obtained a warrant in his particular case.3 The Court’s holding is
correct because it is consistent with Court precedent and properly balanced the public
policy need to deter drunk driving and DWI suspects’ Fourth Amendment4 privacy
rights.
Alcohol related car collisions cause 10,000 to 20,000 fatalities per year in the
United States.5 Accordingly, to reduce drunk driving related deaths, there is a
“compelling need” for states to enforce DWI criminal statutes.6 To enforce DWI
statutes, police rely on three technologies to measure the blood alcohol concentration
(“BAC”) of DWI suspects.7
The first technology police use to gauge BAC is the preliminary, roadside breath
test. Generally, roadside breath tests only establish probable cause to arrest a DWI
suspect but are insufficient evidence to obtain a DWI conviction. 8 To obtain
© Pinchas Balsam, 2021.
* Pinchas Balsam is a student at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author wishes to thank his editors at the Journal of Business and Technology Law for their guidance and feedback.
The author would also like to thank his family and friends for their encouragement and support.
1. 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
2. Id. at 2530.
3. Id. at 2539.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Mitchell 139 S. Ct. at 2536 (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC
SAFETY FACTS 2016 (May 2018)).
6. See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537.
7. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
8. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2191 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
reliability concerns generally limit roadside breath tests to establishing probable cause).
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MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN
admissible evidence of a DWI violation, police administer an evidence grade breath
test; and that test is usually administered at a police station, where the environment
is “conducive to reliable testing.”9 Alternatively, police can conduct a blood test to
obtain evidence grade BAC evidence. And if the DWI suspect is unconscious, the
police can only administer a blood test to obtain BAC evidence.10 Therefore, because
Mitchell was unconscious, the police could only obtain DWI evidence against him
through a blood test.
I. THE CASE

Petitioner Gerald Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated,
after a preliminary breath test determined that his BAC was above the legal limit. 11
Consistent with the standard practice, the police drove Mitchell to the police station
to administer a more reliable, evidence grade breath test.12 By the time Michell
arrived at the police station, however, he was too lethargic for a breath test. The
police therefore drove Mitchell to a nearby hospital for a blood test. 13 When he
arrived at the hospital, Mitchell was unconscious and could not consent to a blood
test.14 Without Mitchell’s consent—and without obtaining a warrant—the police
obtained a blood sample from Mitchell.15 The blood test showed that Mitchell’s BAC
was 0.222%, above the legal limit.16
Subsequently, the state of Wisconsin (“the State”) charged Mitchell for violating
two provisions of the state’s DWI statute.17 At his trial, Mitchell moved to suppress
the BAC evidence and argued that the police acquired it without a warrant and in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 18 In response, the State argued that the
blood test was consensual because Wisconsin has an implied consent law.19 The trial
court denied Mitchell’s motion to suppress, and a jury convicted him of the charged
offenses.20
Michell appealed his convictions, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court the following question: “[does a] warrantless blood

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

2

Id. at 2168 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2184.
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2532.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law,21
where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violate[ ] the Fourth
Amendment.22“ The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, understood the
intermediate appellate court to be asking two questions: First, whether Wisconsin
implied consent is constitutional consent under the Fourth Amendment. And
secondly, “whether a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious person pursuant
to [the Wisconsin implied consent statute] violates the Fourth Amendment.”23 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that under the state’s implied consent law,
Mitchell voluntarily consented to a blood test.24 Furthermore, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that by drinking to the point of unconsciousness, Mitchell
forfeited any opportunity he had to withdraw his consent and the blood test was thus
lawful under the Fourth Amendment. 25
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of the United States granted Mitchell’s petition for
certiorari to decide whether “a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious
motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement.”26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

To prevent drunk driving and ensure safe roads, states have laws that prohibit
motorists from driving with BAC above a specified level.27 And to enforce DWI
laws, states use blood test or breath test technologies to measure DWI suspects’ BAC
and obtain evidence of drunk driving. 28 Because many DWI suspects would not
voluntarily submit to a DWI test, states have implied consent laws that mandate such
testing. These laws present various constitutional questions and specifically raise the
following Fourth Amendment question: how do states enforce DWI laws and
maintain road safety without violating DWI suspects’ Fourth Amendment privacy
rights?
The Supreme Court has decided constitutional questions relating to the arrest and
compulsory BAC testing of DWI suspects from as early as 1957. 29 In Breithaupt v.
Abram, the petitioner, through a writ of habeas corpus, challenged his incarceration
for manslaughter on the grounds that the BAC evidence that supported his conviction

21.
22.
23.
(2019).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(3)(b) (2020).
State v. Mitchell, No. 2015AP304-CR, 2017 WL 9803322 (Wis. Ct. App. 2017).
State v. Mitchell, 914 N.W. 2d 151, 155-56 (Wis. 2018), rev’d, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. 2525
Id. at 167.
Id.
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (2019).
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016).
Id.
See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN
was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.30 Specifically, the
petitioner claimed that drawing his blood while he was unconscious amounted to an
unreasonable search and seizure and violated his Fourth Amendment right to
privacy.31 In reaching its decision, the Court underscored that blood tests are “routine
in everyday life” and required to join the military, matriculate at a university and
obtain a marriage license.32 The Court therefore rejected the petitioner’s argument
that the blood test was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and held that
even though the petitioner was unconscious, conducting a blood test neither
“shock[ed] the conscience” nor violated “traditional ideas of fair play and
decency.”33
Subsequently, in Mapp v. Ohio,34 the Court held that evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment was not admissible in state criminal
prosecutions; the Court therefore re-examined the question of whether BAC blood
tests require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, so as to not be excluded under
Mapp.35 In Schmerber v. California, a DWI suspect was hospitalized for injuries he
sustained in an alcohol related accident.36 At the hospital, the police obtained a blood
sample from the suspect without a warrant and without his consent; the blood sample
was later admitted as evidence for a DWI conviction. 37 Among other constitutional
challenges, Schmerber claimed that forcing him to undergo a blood test violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.38 The Court, however, found that even under Mapp, there
was no Fourth Amendment violation. 39 The Court explained that the police may have
reasonably believed that proceeding with the blood test without obtaining a warrant
was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, since “the percentage of alcohol
in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops.”40 The Court also found
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because blood tests are
“commonplace in these days of periodic physical examination” and therefore
reasonable.41

30.

Id.
Id. at 433-34.
32. Id. at 436; Id. at 439 (explaining that blood test are routine procedures “to which millions of Americans
submit as a matter of course nearly every day.”).
33. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435 (relying on Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), rev’d Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) which held that in state prosecutions for state crimes, the exclusion of evidence obtained through
Fourth Amendment violations is not required).
34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36. Id. at 758.
37. Id. at 758-59.
38. Id. at 759.
39. Id. at 772.
40. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
41. Id. at 771-72.
31.
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Thereafter, the Court clarified that the natural metabolization of alcohol,
discussed in Schmerber does not create a per se exigency exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.42 In Missouri v. McNeeley, a DWI defendant
moved to suppress the results from his BAC blood test on the grounds that the police
obtained the evidence without his consent or a warrant and in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.43 The Court explained that even though there is the risk of
alcohol metabolizing and BAC evidence being lost, warrantless blood tests are not
categorically permissible under the exigency exception.44 Instead, the Court held that
whether the exigent circumstances exception the Fourth Amendment applies must be
determined case by case, based on the totality of the circumstances.45
Later, in 2016, the Supreme Court addressed whether police can administer a
breath test without obtaining warrant. In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court found
that BAC tests are searches that are governed by the Fourth Amendment. 46
Furthermore, the Court distinguished breath tests from blood tests. Specifically, the
Court held that the “search incident to arrest” exception47 permits warrantless breath
tests that are incidental to the arrest since breath tests do not “implicate significant
privacy concerns.”48 And in contrast to breath tests, the Court found that blood tests
are more intrusive because they require “piercing the skin.”49
III. THE COURT’S REASONING

In Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the Court addressed whether police can obtain a
warrantless blood sample from an unconscious DWI suspect. 50 Writing for the
majority, Justice Alito held that when a DWI suspect is unconscious, police can
“almost always” obtain a blood sample without first obtaining a warrant.51 The Court

42.

Missouri v. McNeeley, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).
Id. at 146.
44. Id. at 152-153 (explaining that a categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to
conduct a blood test is not necessary; because BAC evidence dissipates over a gradual and predictable timeframe
and since the police need to transport a DWI suspect to a medical facility to obtain a blood sample, in some cases,
there is time to obtain a warrant).
45. Id. at 145.
46. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016).
47. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (explaining that the search incident to arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment permits police to search an arrestee and the area within his immediate
control).
48. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176-78 (explaining breath tests involve a “negligible physical intrusion” and
“minimum inconvenience.”); Id. (reasoning that breath tests are less intrusive because they are only capable of
providing BAC information.).
49. Id. (noting that a blood test is more intrusive than a breath test because it places in the hands of law
enforcement a sample from which it is possible to extract information beyond BAC information.).
50. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (2019).
51. Id. at 2530.
43.
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MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN
first outlined previous aspects of DWI laws that the Court upheld as constitutional. 52
The Court then underscored the policy need to enforce BAC limitations and thereby
save lives.53 Next, the Court explained the exigent circumstances exception to the
Fourth Amendment and the Court’s prior jurisprudence on the scope of the exigency
exception.54 Finally, applying Court precedent, the Court concluded that the exigent
circumstances exception applies in “almost all” situations in which a DWI suspect is
unconscious.55
The Court first explained its previous decisions on whether state DWI laws that
mandate BAC testing violate the Fourth Amendment.56 The Court began by
underscoring that BAC tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment. 57 And
because BAC tests are Fourth Amendment searches, warrantless BAC tests are only
constitutional when an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
exists.58 Under this constitutional framework, the Court explained that it previously
held that the search incident to the arrest exception permits warrantless breath tests
on DWI suspects.59 The Court further noted that it previously held that the exigent
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permits police to conduct a
warrantless blood test if the police reasonably believe that delaying a blood test to
obtain a warrant would lead to the destruction of evidence.60 Finally, the Court
explained that the natural metabolization of BAC evidence does not categorically
establish an exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment.61
The Court also underscored the public policy need to enforce BAC limitations.
The Court explained that BAC tests are necessary to save lives because drunk driving
kills between 10,000 and 20,000 Americans annually.62 To ensure highway safety,
states must prohibit motorists from driving with BAC levels above a set limit and
52.

Id. at 2532-35.
Id. at 2535-37.
54. Id. at 2537-38.
55. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
56. Id. at 2532-35.
57. Id. at 2533.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185).
60. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2533 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). In Schmerber, the police had to
investigate an accident and transport the DWI suspect to a hospital which led the Court to conclude that the police
did not have time to obtain a warrant. 384 US at 770-71.
61. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2533 (citing Missouri v. McNeeley, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013)).
62. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct at 2535-36 (noting that The Court had “strained [its] vocal cords to give adequate
expression” to the public interest of having safe roads); See e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)
(explaining that the states have a “paramount” interest in preserving road safety); Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439
(comparing drunk driving to “slaughter” taking place on “battlefields”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553,
558 (1983) (describing preventable accidents as “tragic” and blaming drunk drivers for “carnage”); Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackman, J., concurring) (explaining that irresponsible driving can cause “frightful
carnage”).
53.
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enforce the BAC limitations through BAC tests.63 BAC tests, according to the Court,
seem to make a big difference in reducing drunk driving deaths; as states enacted
stricter BAC limitations, DWI deaths decreased.64 Accordingly, the Court concluded,
accurate BAC tests are a necessary measure to deter drunk driving and, specifically,
blood tests are necessary when a DWI suspect is unconscious and unable to take a
breath test.65
After explaining the policy need to enforce BAC limitations, the Court outlined
its jurisprudence on the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment.
The Court first explained that Schmerber established that the police can conduct
warrantless blood tests under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment, if the police reasonably believe that there is not sufficient time to obtain
a warrant.66 The Court then concluded that like the car accident in Schmerber,
Mitchell’s unconsciousness created “pressing needs” that may have precluded the
police from obtaining a warrant.67 Additionally, the Court held that Mitchell’s
unconsciousness distinguishes his case from McNeely, an “uncomplicated drunk
driving scenario” in which there was no exigent circumstances exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 68
The Court held that the police can “almost always” obtain a warrantless blood
sample from an unconscious DWI suspect.69 The Court, however, did not rule out
the unusual possibility of an unconscious DWI suspect demonstrating that the police
could not have reasonably believed that obtaining a warrant would have interfered
with other pressing needs or duties.70 Therefore, the Court remanded the case to give
Mitchell an opportunity to make such a showing.71

63.

Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535.
Id. at 2536.
65. Id. at 2537 (noting that there is an even greater need to conduct a BAC test on an unconscious DWI
suspect because such a suspect poses a greater danger to the public and doing otherwise, would be “perverse”
and a reward for “wanton behavior.”).
66. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing Schmerber 384 U.S. at 770). The Court explained that an exigency
exists when BAC evidence is metabolizing and some other factor “creates pressing health, safety, or law
enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application.” Mitchell, 139 S. Ct at 2537.
67. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537-39 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770) (explaining that an unconscious DWI
suspect will need to be transported to a hospital for urgent medical treatment and the medical treatment might
delay a blood test and thus reduce its evidentiary value); Id. (noting that in many drunk driving cases in which
the driver is unconscious, there is also an accident that further compounds the exigency); Id. at 2538.
68. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (distinguishing McNeely).
69. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2539.
70. Id.
71. Id.
64.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas concluded that the plurality’s rule will
be difficult to apply. 72 Justice Thomas stated that the Court should have held that the
natural metabolization of alcohol creates a per se exigent circumstances exception
that allows the police to conduct a warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI
suspect.73 According to Justice Thomas, the natural metabolization of alcohol is
always an exigency because the penalty for drunk driving depends on obtaining
evidence of the suspect’s BAC.74 Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the plurality is
presumably creating a difficult to apply rule to avoid overturning McNeely.75
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor rejected the plurality’s rule and characterized it
as “a presumption of exigent circumstances that Wisconsin does not urge.”76 Justice
Sotomayor explained that under Schmerber, there is no categorical exception that
permits warrantless blood tests.77 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor rejects the
plurality opinion because it relies on the exigent circumstances exception that
Wisconsin never raised.78 And according to Justice Sotomayor, Wisconsin could not
have argued for the exigent circumstances exception because police do not conduct
blood tests at the arrest scene; rather, the police must first drive the suspect to a
medical facility and that delay may provide time for the police to obtain a warrant.79
Finally, Justice Sotomayor explained that in the case of an unconscious DWI suspect,
there should not be a categorical exception to the warrant requirement because the
suspect’s BAC dissipates gradually and predictably and there is a guaranteed delay
in administering a blood test because the suspect must first be transported to a
medical facility.80 Therefore, according to Justice Sotomayor, to obtain a blood
sample from an unconscious DWI suspect, the police need to obtain a warrant “if
possible” and there is no presumption that the police can “almost always” order a
warrantless blood test.81
72. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2539 (Thomas, J., concurring) (reasoning that the difficult rule will “rarely be
rebutted” but will burden those attempting to apply it).
73. Id. (citing McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
74. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2540-41 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 2541 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that in contrast to the plurality’s reluctance to overturn
McNeely, that case was wrongly decided and should be overturned).
76. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2545-46 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that there were no facts in the record that justified
the Court’s presumption that exigent circumstances “most likely” existed).
79. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2546-48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that technological advancements
enable “more expeditious processing of warrant applications.”); Id. at 2548 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154). Specifically, in many states, police can apply for warrants remotely, through email,
telephone, radio, or video conferencing communications. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2548 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citing McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154).
80. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2549 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2550-51 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch stated that he “would have dismissed this case as
improvidently granted.”82 Justice Gorsuch explained that the Court granted certiorari
to decide whether Wisconsin drivers “impliedly consented” to a warrantless blood
test.83 While Justice Gorsuch acknowledged that the Court can reach its conclusion
based on “any reason supported in the record,” he believed that applying the exigent
circumstances in this case involved “complex questions” that could be better
resolved at the courts below. 84 Therefore, Justice Gorsuch did not accept the Court’s
conclusion that the police can “almost always” order a blood test on an unconscious
DWI suspect.85
IV. ANALYSIS

The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is correct because it is consistent with Court
precedent on that issue. First, in Breithaupt, the Court held that blood tests are
“routine in everyday life.”86 Additionally, the Court found that blood tests neither
“shock the conscience” nor violate “traditional ideas of fair play and decency.”87 The
Court therefore found that a warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI suspect
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 88 Accordingly, the Court’s holding that the
police can “almost always” conduct a warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI
suspect is consistent with the Court’s holding in Breithaupt that allowed a
warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI suspect.89
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is also consistent with Schmerber. In Schmerber,
the Court reemphasized that blood tests are “common place in these days of periodic
physical examination”90 and held that warrantless blood tests are constitutional in
situations in which the police could reasonably believe that a warrantless blood test
was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence.91 Likewise, in this case, since
the police had to investigate the accident and transport Mitchell to a hospital, the
police could have reasonably believed a warrantless blood test on Mitchell was
necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence.92 Therefore, the Court’s conclusion

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2551 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
352 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 435-37
Id. at 439-40.
See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436-40 (1957).
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
Id. at 770.
See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2532.
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MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN
that a warrantless blood test on Mitchell was most likely constitutional is consistent
with the Court’s holding in Schmerber.
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is consistent with McNeely. In McNeely, the
Court held that the natural metabolization of alcohol and BAC evidence does not
create a per se exigent circumstances exception to permit a warrantless blood test.93
Rather, the Court held that whether exigent circumstances exist depends on the
“totality of the circumstances” and the facts of the case.94 In this case, the Court did
not categorically permit warrantless blood tests on unconscious DWI suspects.95
Instead, the Court acknowledged that Mitchell might be able to prove that the police
could not have reasonably believed that obtaining a warrant would have led to the
destruction of BAC evidence; and the Court remanded the case to provide Mitchell
an opportunity to make such a showing.96 Accordingly, since the Court did not
categorically permit warrantless blood tests in cases of unconscious DWI suspects,
the Court’s conclusion is consistent with McNeely.
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is likewise consistent with Birchfield. In
Birchfield, the Court held that blood tests are more intrusive than breath tests and are
therefore not categorically permitted without a warrant.97 However, the Court did not
conclude that warrants are categorically required to conduct a blood test on every
DWI suspect. To the contrary, the Court acknowledged that blood tests are necessary
when the DWI suspect is unconscious and police “may apply for a warrant if need
be.”98 The Court did not conclude in Birchfield that a warrant is categorically required
to conduct a blood test on a DWI suspect, so accordingly, the Court’s conclusion is
consistent with Birchfield. Because the Court’s conclusion in Mitchell is consistent
with the Court’s jurisprudence regarding administering blood tests to DWI suspects,
the Court’s decision is correct.
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is correct because the Court properly balanced
the compelling public policy need to deter drunk driving and the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment privacy rights. As the Court pointed out, alcohol related car collisions
cause 10,000 to 20,000 fatalities per year and there is therefore a “vital public

93.

Missouri v. McNeeley, 569 U.S. 141, 152 (2013).
Id. at 145.
95. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2539.
96. Id.
97. 136 S. Ct. at 2185.
98. Id. (stating that “if need be” implies that the police do not always need a warrant in such a situation and
regular Fourth Amendment exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances, apply).
94.
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interest” for states to enforce DWI criminal statutes.99 Hence, the Court has “strained
[its] vocal cords to give adequate expression to the stakes.”100
Drunk driving substantially increases the risk of a motor vehicle accident.101 For
example, an increase of BAC of 0.02 percent doubles the relative risk of a motor
vehicle crash among 16- to 20-year old males, and the risk of an accident increases
to nearly 52 times when a driver’s BAC is between 0.08 percent and 0.10 percent,
the legal limits in many states.102 The increased risk occurs because alcohol
negatively affects brain function.103
Drunk driving accidents also impose substantial economic harm. For example, in
2010, deaths and damages from DWIs costed 44 billion dollars.104 And for each DWI
incident, “the externality imposed on society . . . may be as high as $8,000.”105
Accordingly, to protect the public from the dangers and economic harms posed by
drunk driving, states have a compelling interest in enforcing DWI criminal statutes.
To enforce DWI criminal statutes, states need to obtain blood samples from
unconscious motorists. As the Supreme Court held in Mackey v. Montrym, effective
enforcement of impaired driving laws is required for the laws to operate as a
“deterrent” and remove intoxicated drivers from the road.106 Put differently, the
Court has stated that “no one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken
driving problem or the states’ interest in eradicating it.”107
In addition to discouraging drunk driving, states have a compelling need to obtain
blood samples from unconscious drivers to deter motorists from driving while under
the influence of drugs.108 Between 2006 and 2016, the number of fatally injured

99.

Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535-36.
Id. at 2535. See also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (explaining that the states have a
“paramount” interest in preserving road safety); Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439 (comparing drunk driving to
“slaughter” taking place on “battlefields”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) (describing
preventable accidents as “tragic” and blaming drunk drivers for “carnage”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401
(1971) (Blackman, J., concurring) (explaining that irresponsible driving can cause “frightful carnage”).
101. Why Drunk Drivers May Get Behind the Wheel, SCI. DAILY (Aug. 18, 2010),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/08/100817171607.htm.
102. Id.
103. Alcohol’s Damaging Effects on the Brain, 63 ALCOHOL A LERT (2004).
104. Drunk Driving Overview, U.S DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.
https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving.
105. Miguel de Figueiredo, Throw Away the Key or Throw Away the Jail? The Effect of Punishment on
Recidivism and Social Cost, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1017, 1043 (2015).
106. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1979).
107. Mich. Dep’t of St. Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) The Court concluded that Michigan’s sobriety
checkpoints were consistent with the Fourth Amendment because of the dangers posed by drunk driving); Id. at
455.
108. See Jacqueline Howard, ER Visits For Opioid Overdose Up 30%, CDC Study Finds, CNN (Mar. 6, 2018,
1:29
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/health/opioid-overdoseemergency-departments-cdcstudy/index.html.
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drivers who tested positive for drugs rose from 27.8 percent to 43.6 percent.109 Drug
impaired drivers cause approximately 20 percent of car crashes, which translates into
8,600 deaths, 580,000 injuries, and $33 billion in property damage each year in the
United States.110 In particular, marijuana impaired driving is an increasing problem.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 13 percent of nighttime
and weekend drivers have marijuana in their system.111 Drug impaired drivers are
often unconscious, and to determine whether these motorists are under the influence
of drugs, blood draws are required because breath tests cannot detect narcotics.112
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that states have a compelling
interest in preventing drunk driving. In Breithaupt, the Court compared DWI related
deaths to “slaughter” on “battlefields” and underscored the need to discourage drunk
driving by enforcing BAC limits.113 Similarly, in McNeely, the Court discussed the
“compelling governmental need” to deter drunk driving. 114 In South Dakota v.
Neville, the Court attributed “carnage” to drunk driving.115 And in Birchfield, the
Court explained that States have a “paramount interest . . . in preserving the safety
of . . . public highways” and “in creating effective deterrent[s] to drunken driving.”116
The Court correctly balanced unconscious DWI suspects’ Fourth Amendment
privacy rights and the compelling public policy need to deter drunk driving. The
litmus test for whether a police search is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment
is whether the search is reasonable–based on the totality of the circumstances.117 And
the reasonableness of a search is determined by “assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree
to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”118
Blood draws from unconscious drivers are reasonable police searches and
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Police cannot administer warrantless blood
tests on DWI suspects in every scenario. Rather, DWI enforcement laws are
governed like other Fourth Amendment situations in which exceptions to the warrant

GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, DRUG IMPAIRED DRIVING (2018).
Brief for League of Wis. Municipalities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Mitchell v.
Wisconsin 139. S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
111. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: IMPAIRED DRIVING, GET THE FACTS.
112. GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, DRUG IMPAIRED DRIVING (2018).
113. 352 U.S. at 439.
114. 569 U.S. at 159 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985)).
115. 459 U.S. 553, 558-59 (1983); See also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackman, J.,
concurring) (explaining that irresponsible driving can cause “frightful carnage”).
116. 136 S. Ct. at 2178-79 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
117. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001); Ohio v. Robinette 519 U.S. 39 (1996).
118. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
109.
110.
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requirement may or may not apply, depending on the case.119 One exception to the
Fourth Amendment is the exigent circumstances exception. 120 And as the Court
concluded in McNeely, determining whether an exigency exists depends on the
“totality of the circumstances” and the facts of the case.121 Regarding unconscious
DWI suspects, the Court did not conclude that the police can always conduct a
warrantless blood test based on the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment.122 Instead, the Court held that DWI suspects must be given a chance to
show that the police could have obtained a warrant.123 Therefore, because the Court
did not establish a categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement—but instead relied on the reasonable and well-established exigent
circumstances exception—the Court’s conclusion is consistent with DWI suspects’
Fourth Amendment rights.
V. CONCLUSION

In Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the Court held that police can “almost always” order a
warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI suspect.124 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court underscored the important public policy need to maintain road
safety by enforcing DWI criminal statutes that deter drunk driving. 125 Furthermore,
the Court explained its prior jurisprudence on the exigent circumstances exception to
the Fourth Amendment126 and explained why the exigency exception “almost
always” permits a warrantless blood test in the case of an unconscious DWI
suspect.127 The Court’s decision was correct because it is consistent with Court
precedent and properly balanced the compelling public policy need to deter drunk
driving and unconscious DWI suspects’ Fourth Amendment rights.128

119. See e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding that a warrantless blood test is permitted in a situation
in which the police could have reasonably believed that a delay would have led to the destruction of BAC
evidence).
120. McNeely, 569 U.S at 148.
121. Id. at 145.
122. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2531.
123. Id. at 2539.
124. Id.
125. See supra part III.
126. See supra part II.
127. See supra part III.
128. See supra part IV.
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